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Abstract
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey (MEPS), we analyze the health gap between married and unmarried individuals 
of working-age. Controlling for observables, we fi nd a gap that peaks at 10 percentage points 
at ages 55-59 years. The marriage health gap is similar for men and women. If we allow 
for unobserved heterogeneity in innate health (permanent and age-dependent), potentially 
correlated with timing and likelihood of marriage, we fi nd that the effect of marriage on 
health disappears below age 40 years, while about 5 percentage points difference between 
married and unmarried individuals remains at older ages (55-59 years). This indicates that 
the observed gap is mainly driven by selection into marriage at younger ages, but there 
might be a protective effect of marriage at older ages. Exploring the mechanisms behind this 
result, we fi nd that better innate health is associated with a higher probability of marriage 
and a lower probability of divorce, and there is strong assortative mating among couples 
by innate health. We also fi nd that married individuals are more likely to have a healthier 
behavior compared to unmarried ones. Finally, we fi nd that health insurance is critical for 
the benefi cial effect of marriage.
Keywords: health, marriage, innate health, protective effect of marriage, assortative mating, 
panel data, grouped-fi xed-effects estimator.
JEL classifi cation: I10, I12, J10.
Resumen
Este estudio utiliza datos de dos encuestas de individuos en Estados Unidos, el Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) y el Medical Expenses Panel Survey (MEPS), para analizar 
posibles diferencias en el estado de salud entre las personas casadas y las solteras, ambas 
en edad de trabajar. Cuando se comparan individuos con la misma edad, renta, educación, 
sexo y raza, se encuentra que las personas casadas declaran un estado de salud superior 
al de las solteras. Esta diferencia es aproximadamente de 5 puntos porcentuales en edades 
de 35-40 años y aumenta hasta 10 puntos porcentuales en edades de 55-59 años. El 
mejor estado de salud entre los casados es similar para hombres y mujeres. Por otra 
parte, una vez se mantienen constantes las diferencias no observadas en la salud innata 
(modelizadas como una variable latente que varía con la edad, y que está potencialmente 
correlacionada entre periodos y con la probabilidad de estar casado) encontramos que el 
efecto positivo del matrimonio sobre la salud desaparece entre los jóvenes (hasta 40 años), 
mientras que se sitúa alrededor de 5 puntos porcentuales en edades más avanzadas 
(entre los 55 y 59 años). Estos resultados indican que los diferenciales observados se 
deben principalmente a un sesgo de selección a edades tempranas, pero que puede haber 
un efecto protector del matrimonio a edades avanzadas. Explorando los mecanismos 
existentes detrás de este resultado, encontramos que una mejor salud innata se asocia 
con una mayor probabilidad de estar casado y una menor probabilidad de divorciarse, 
y que existe un fuerte emparejamiento selectivo de las parejas según su salud innata. 
También encontramos que las personas casadas tienen una mayor probabilidad de seguir 
comportamientos saludables que las solteras. Finalmente, encontramos que la tenencia de 
un seguro médico es una variable muy importante a la hora de explicar el efecto benefi cioso 
del matrimonio sobre la salud.
Palabras clave: salud, matrimonio, salud innata, efecto protector del matrimonio, 
emparejamiento selectivo, datos del panel, estimador de efectos fi jos agrupados.
Códigos JEL: I10, I12, J10.
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I. Introduction
Married individuals are healthier and live longer than unmarried ones. This
fact was first documented by British epidemiologist William Farr more than 150
years ago, and has been established by many studies since then.1 The question
is, of course, why? Does the association between marriage and health indicate a
protective effect of marriage, or is it simply an artifact of selection, as healthier
people are more likely to get married in the first place? The answer to this ques-
tion is critical as it has important implications for public policy.2 Studies on the
link between public policy and health suggest that “upstream social and economic
determinants of health are of major health importance, and hence that social and
economic policy and practice may be the major route to improving population
health.” (House, Schoeni, Kaplan and Pollack, 2008, p.22). The alarming in-
crease in morbidity and mortality among white males in recent years in the U.S.
highlighted once again the importance of socio-economic determinants of health
(Case and Deaton, 2015). Marriage is often portrayed as a solution for many
social problems in the U.S. (see Waite and Gallagher, 2000), and the effectiveness
of pro-marriage policies depends on whether marriage indeed makes individuals
healthier, wealthier and happier.
In this paper we study the relationship between health and marriage using the
U.S. data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). In both data sets married individuals report
to be healthier than unmarried ones, and they do so in remarkably similar levels.
The gap in self-reported health persists after we control for observable characteris-
tics such as education, income, race, gender and the presence of children; starting
at about 3 percentage points at younger ages (20 to 39 years), and increasing con-
tinuously for older ages, reaching a peak of 10 percentage points around ages 55
to 59 years. A similar picture emerges when we consider objective instead of self-
reported measures of health, or when we use the occurrence of chronic conditions
as an indicator of poor health.
We define the marriage health gap as the difference between age-dependent
health curves for married and single individuals, which we specify nonparametri-
cally. Different studies in evolutionary biology suggest that several physical and
personality traits that define a person as attractive for mating are associated with
youth and health, and as a result, with reproductive capacity.3 Hence, individuals
1 On Farr’s study, see Parker-Pope (2010).
2 “Between 1950 and 2011, real GDP per capita grew at an average of 2.0% per year, while
real national health care expenditures per capita grew at 4.4% per year. The gap between the
two rates of growth —2.4% per year— resulted in the share of the GDP related to health care
spending increasing from 4.4% in 1950 to 17.9% in 2011.” (Fuchs, 2013, p.108).
3 For instance, see Buss (1994) and Dawkins (1989).
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individuals with better innate health are more attractive marriage partners, and,
as a result, more likely to get married in the first place and stay married after-
wards, least squares estimation of these curves would provide biased estimates of
the effect of marriage on health.
Using the panel structure of the PSID, we try to overcome this selection bias by
accounting for individual heterogeneity in (unobserved) innate health, potentially
correlated with the timing and likelihood of marriage. We consider three models.
We first consider a standard fixed-effects specification, which allows for unobserved
differences in permanent innate health. This is, however, a restrictive approach,
since it assumes that the innate health is constant over time, while it is reasonable
to expect that differences in innate health become more important at older ages.
To allow for age-dependent effects of innate health, our second model follows
a grouped-fixed-effects approach, developed by Bonhomme and Manresa (2015).
The grouped-fixed-effects estimator that we implement allows for age-dependent
patterns of unobserved heterogeneity that are common for individuals that belong
to the same group but potentially differ across groups (e.g. groups formed by
individuals with high and low innate health). The two approaches give very
similar results: the observed effect of marriage on health disappears for younger
ages (20-39 years), while about a 5 percentage point gap between married and
unmarried individuals remains for older ages (55-59 years). This is half of the
total difference for this age group (10 percentage points). These results suggest
that the association between marriage and health at younger ages is likely to be
driven by selection of healthier individuals into marriage, while there might be
a protective effect of marriage that shows up at older ages. Finally, since health
shocks might affect the probability of getting or staying married in subsequent
periods, we control for previous health shocks by using a dynamic panel data
model with fixed effects. We estimate this model by the system-GMM approach
in Arellano and Bover (1995). This approach delivers a larger marriage health
gap (about 10 percentage points by for ages 50-59 years), and suggests that our
fixed-effects and grouped-fixed-effects estimates might be on the conservative side.
We also find that three alternative estimation strategies produce similar marriage
health gaps for males and females.
Next we provide evidence that is indicative of how selection and protection might
show up in the data. On the selection side, we first document that individuals who
are ever married by age 30 (or 40) years have better average innate permanent
health than those individuals who are never married by that age. The variance of
permanent health, on the other hand, is larger for those who are never married.
with better innate health tend to be more attractive in the marriage market. If
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These facts are consistent with a world in which individuals look for healthy
partners in the marriage market. In such a world, healthy singles have an incentive
to wait for a healthy partner, healthy individuals are more likely to marry and
less likely to divorce. As a result, innate health should be a good predictor of
marriage and divorce probabilities and individuals would mate assortatively in
terms of innate health. We then corroborate that data supports both predictions.
Having better innate health is associated with higher probability of marriage and
lower probability of divorce. Likewise, the correlation between husbands’ and
wives’ uncovered measures of innate health is about 37%, and remains large and
significant (about 32%) even after controlling for college, race, and a measure of
permanent income.
On positive effects of marriage on health that are not captured by selection, we
find that married individuals are more likely to engage in preventive medical care
than singles are, even after controlling for observable characteristics (including
health expenditures, health insurance, and socio-economic variables). Married
individuals around ages 50 to 54 years, for example, are about 6% more likely
to check their cholesterol or have a prostate or breast examination. Marriage
also promotes healthy habits. We focus on smoking, a major health risk. Our
results show that a single individual is about 23 percentage points more likely to
quit smoking if he/she gets married than if he/she stays single. Furthermore, a
majority (about 74%) of singles who get married and quit smoking do so while
they are married. The importance of healthy behavior also shows up in health
expenditure patterns. While married individuals spend more on their health when
they are young and healthy, singles end up spending more than married individuals
when they are older and less healthy.
A possible important factor behind these differences in healthy behavior is health
insurance: while about 10% of married individuals do not have any public or
private insurance, this share amounts to 20% for unmarried females and 25% for
unmarried males. Indeed, if we focus on individuals without health insurance,
we do not find a significant marriage health gap. These findings suggest that the
availability of health insurance is an important facilitator for positive effects of
marriage on health.
We finally show that the effect of marriage on health is cumulative. In particular,
we estimate the effect of the total number of years an individual has been married
(marriage capital) and find a positive and significant effect on health, especially
at older ages. These results are consistent with our baseline estimates.
This paper is related to the large literature on the relation between socioeco-
nomic status and health (Stowasser, Heiss, McFadden and Winter, 2012). It is
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well documented that marriage is associated with positive health outcomes. Wood,
Avellar and Goesling (2009) and Wilson and Oswald (2005) provide reviews of
existing evidence. Pijoan-Mas and R´ıos-Rull (2014) estimate, using the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS), age-specific survival probabilities conditional upon
socio-economic characteristics and show that married females (males) are expected
to live 1.2 (2.2) years longer than their single counterparts. The existing literature
also documents that health outcomes and healthy behavior are correlated between
spouses, see e.g. Clark and Etile´ (2006), Oreffice and Quintana-Domenque (2010),
Chiappori, Oreffice and Quintana-Domenque (2012, 2013) and Banks, Kelly and
Smith (2014). There is also a large and positive effect of education on health
(e.g. Lleras-Muney, 2005; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010), which goes beyond
the higher financial resources that it brings (Gardner and Oswald, 2004; Smith,
2007). Finally, there is a growing literature in labor economics and macroeco-
nomics that introduce health shocks and expenditures into life-cycle models with
heterogeneous agents. French (2005), De Nardi, French and Jones (2010), Prados
(2013), Ozkan (2014), Cole, Kim and Krueger (2014), Kopecky and Koreshkova
(2014), Braun, Kopecky and Koreshkova (2015), Jung and Tran (2016) and Jung,
Tran and Chambers (2016) are recent examples.
In the existing literature, one approach to estimate the effect of marital status on
health (mortality or self-reported health) is to regress health outcomes on marital
status (or history) with controls for health in early ages. This approach is used to
mitigate the effects of the selection of healthier individuals into marriage. Murray
(2000), who follows a sample of male graduates from Amherst College in Mas-
sachusetts, finds evidence both of selection of healthy individuals into marriage
as well as of a protective effect of marriage on health outcomes. Another ap-
proach to control for selection is to estimate fixed-effects regressions. Using this
approach on Canadian data, Averett, Argys and Sorkin (2013) find that while
marriage has a positive effect on health in the form of better mental health and
lower alcohol consumption, it is also associated with weight gain and less frequent
exercising. Using a duration analysis and exploiting a timing-of-events approach
for identification, van den Berg and Gupta (2015) correct the potential selection
into marriage by accounting for fixed permanent unobserved heterogeneity. Using
Dutch registry data for individuals born between 1812 and 1902, they study the
age-dependent effect of marriage on mortality and how this effect is influenced by
the early childhood conditions. Finally, an alternative approach is to find valid
instruments that generate exogenous variation in health or marriage outcomes.
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Finding such instruments in not an easy task (Adams, Hurd, McFadden, Merrill
and Ribeiro, 2003). Lillard and Panis (1996), using data on males from the PSID,
take a simultaneous equations (instrumental variables) approach and find that
there might be negative selection into marriage as less healthy men have more to
gain from marriage.
In this paper, we make three contributions to the existing literature. First, we
study self-reported health status for working age (20 to 64 years) individuals and
identify nonparametrically the marriage health gap as a function of age. Sec-
ond, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in innate health (permanent and age-
dependent), potentially correlated with timing and likelihood of marriage. Our
approach to deal with potentially correlated age-dependent unobserved hetero-
geneity is novel in this literature. In particular, we estimate the effect of marriage
on health using a grouped-fixed-effects estimator, which allows for a flexible and
yet parsimonious specification of age-dependent unobserved heterogeneity. Fi-
nally, our exploration of the potential channels through which selection and pro-
tection may show up in the data is also a contribution. We find that our uncovered
measures of innate health are associated with higher probabilities of marriage and
lower probabilities of divorce; there is also strong assortative mating among cou-
ples by innate health; and we highlight preventive health care and health insurance
as possible factors behind the protective effects of marriage on health.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe data sources and
provide descriptive statistics. We discuss our empirical strategy in Section III.
Section IV presents main results. In Section V, we document suggestive evidence
on selection and protection. Section VI concludes.
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use two data sources to document the relationship between marriage and
health. The first data source is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The PSID began in 1968 with a nationally representative sample of over 18,000
individuals living in 5,000 families in the United States. Extensive demographic
and economic data on these individuals and their descendants have been collected
continuously since then. Starting in 1984, the PSID has been collecting data on
self-reported health of individuals. We use data from 1984 to 2013. The data
are annual until 1997 and biannual afterwards. Sample selection and variable
definitions are explained in Appendix A. Appendix B shows descriptive statistics.
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Table 1—Marriage Ratios and Transitions In and Out of Marriage by Age
B. Marriage
A. Marriage Ratios Transitions
Married Divorced/Sep. Widowed Never Married Marr. Single
Age: PSID MEPS PSID MEPS PSID MEPS PSID MEPS Single Marr.
20-24 36.9 16.4 7.1 2.5 0.1 0.0 55.8 81.1 8.1 11.6
25-29 52.1 43.4 10.8 7.3 0.3 0.2 36.9 49.1 5.3 11.3
30-34 63.5 60.3 14.7 10.8 0.5 0.2 21.2 28.7 3.9 10.1
35-39 69.3 65.2 17.2 14.9 0.8 0.6 12.7 19.4 3.1 7.2
40-44 70.8 66.2 19.1 18.4 1.0 1.1 9.1 14.4 2.7 7.0
45-49 71.5 68.0 19.8 19.8 1.6 1.8 7.1 10.5 2.1 4.4
50-54 73.0 68.8 18.1 20.2 3.3 2.8 5.7 8.2 1.9 4.5
55-59 74.1 69.1 16.3 19.3 5.5 5.0 4.0 6.5 1.4 2.2
60-64 73.7 68.2 14.2 17.1 9.0 9.7 3.1 4.9 1.8 2.2
Note: Panel A presents the weighted proportion of individual-year observations in each of four marital
situations, and Panel B presents the proportion of married individuals getting unmarried in the following
year (left column) and of unmarried individuals transiting into marriage (right column), within five-
year age groups. Panel A is computed using the PSID and the MEPS as indicated; in Panel B, the
PSID is used. PSID sample covers 1984-2013, annually until 1997, biannually since then; MEPS sample
covers 1996-2009 annually. One-year transitions in Panel B are computed for 1984-1997, when yearly
observations are available.
The main health variable we use in this analysis is self-rated health.4 Each
household head is asked to rate his/her as well as his/her spouse’s health as excel-
lent, very good, good, fair, or poor.5 We consider those with excellent, very good
or good health as healthy and others as unhealthy. As Table B1 in Appendix B
shows, throughout the sample period, about 88% of individuals are healthy ac-
cording to this definition. Likewise, about 66% of individuals are married. We
consider those who declare themselves married in the surveys as married and
others (never married, divorced or widowed, separated, as well as cohabitants)
as unmarried. In the sample, about 32% of individuals have a college degree.
Per-adult household income is about 38,000 in 2005 U.S. dollars.
The second data source is the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). The
MEPS is a set of surveys of families and individuals, their medical providers, and
employers across the U.S. and is the most complete source of data on the cost and
use of health care and health insurance coverage. The MEPS has two major com-
ponents: the Household Component and the Insurance Component. The House-
hold Component, which is used here, provides data from individual households
and their members, which is supplemented by data from their medical providers.
The Household Component contains detailed information for each person in the
household on demographic characteristics, health conditions, health status, usage
4 Bound (1991) discusses the implications of using subjective and objective health measures.
5 The fact that head is reporting the health status of himself/herself and his/her spouse
could be of potential importance for our analysis of assortative mating. This issue is discussed
in Section V.B.
of medical services, charges and source of payments, access to care, satisfaction
with care, health insurance coverage, income, and employment. The MEPS is a
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Figure 1. Health and Marital Status (PSID and MEPS)
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Note: Plotted lines represent the weighted fraction of married and unmarried individuals that report
being healthy, computed using the PSID and the MEPS. The horizontal axis indicates age, which is
grouped in five-year categories (20-24 through 60-64). Confidence bands of ± two standard errors are
computed according to the corresponding survey design: sample weights are used for the PSID, and
Taylor linearized standard errors are computed for the MEPS. PSID standard errors are clustered at
the household level.
rotating panel where panel members are interviewed 5 times over a 2-year interval.
In the analysis below we use pooled data from panels from 1996 to 2009.
Table B2 in Appendix B shows descriptive statistics for the MEPS sample.
The MEPS and the PSID samples are quite similar in terms of education and
household income. A smaller fraction of the MEPS sample is married, which
reflects the facts that it covers relatively more recent years than the PSID does.
About 16% of individuals in the MEPS sample do not have any, public or private,
insurance. Individuals on average spend about 3,000 per year on health in 2005
U.S. dollars, which is about 9% of their total income.
Table 1 documents the marital status of the population in the PSID and MEPS
samples (Panel A) and marital transitions in the PSID (Panel B). In both sam-
ples, almost all individuals eventually marry. Less than 5% of individuals remain
never-married by ages 60-64 years. The fractions of individuals who are mar-
ried, divorced or widowed increase monotonically by age. The fraction of people
who are married in younger ages is larger in the PSID, which, as we commented
above, reflects the fact that the MEPS covers more recent years than the PSID.
For younger ages, there is significant turnover in marital status (Panel B). About
5% of married individuals between ages 25 to 29 years become unmarried each year
(mainly divorced), and about 11% of singles in the same age group get married.
The size of marital transitions declines as individuals age.
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Figure 1 shows differences between married (dark brown lines) and unmarried
(light brown lines) individuals in self-reported health from the PSID (dashed lines)
and the MEPS (solid lines) for ages between 20 and 64 years. Age patterns of self-
reported health as well as the health gap between married and unmarried individu-
als are remarkably similar in the two data sets. On average for all ages considered
(20-64 years), 90% of married individuals indicate that they are healthy, while
only 85% of unmarried ones do so. Not surprisingly, in very early ages most indi-
viduals (more than 90%) are in good health and the marriage health gap is small.
For older ages the marriage health gap widens, and among those who are 40 to 64
years old, 86% of married individuals are healthy in contrast to 76% of unmarried.
Figure 2. Health and Marital Status for Different Socioeconomic Groups
A. Male vs female B. White vs black C. Without vs with children (0-12)
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D. College vs non-College E. Above vs below median income F. Old vs Young Cohorts
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Note: Plotted lines represent the weighted fraction of married and unmarried individuals that report
being healthy, obtained from the PSID. Fractions are reported, as indicated, for male and female, white
and black, without and with children aged 0-12 living in the household, college graduates and non-
college, above and below median income, and born after and before 1970. The horizontal axis indicates
age, which is grouped in five-year categories (20-24 through 60-64). Confidence bands of ± two standard
errors are computed using sample weights. Standard errors are clustered a the household level.
6The results for the MEPS sample are in Figure B1 in Appendix B.
The fact that married individuals are healthier than single ones could be due to
a host of factors. Figure 2 reproduces Figure 1 for different sub-populations based
on a few observable characteristics for the PSID sample.6 In each sub-panel, dark
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brown lines indicate married individuals while light brown lines are for unmarried
ones, and solid and dashed lines indicate the different sub-populations. As Panel A
shows, males and females report very similar levels of health both when they are
married and when they are single. According to Panel B, blacks have on average
worse health than whites and the marriage health gap vanishes for blacks at older
ages. In Panel C, the marriage health gap is visible and comparable whether
or not one conditions on the presence of young children (ages 0 to 12 years) —
estimates become imprecise at older ages, because few of those individuals have
young children). Consistent with findings from the previous literature, individuals
with better education and income have much better health. While the marriage
health gap is similar conditional on college education (Panel D, the gap is larger
for poorer individuals (Panel E). Finally, while younger cohorts report slightly
lower levels of good health when unmarried, the marriage health gap is similar for
individuals born before and after 1970 (Panel F).
III. Model Specification and Identification
In this section we describe our empirical strategy and discuss briefly how we
aim to identify the effect of marriage on health. Our objective is to estimate how
being married affects an individual’s health at each point along his/her life cycle.
Thus we are interested in heterogeneous treatment effect along the life cycle. The
main challenge in identifying the effects of marriage on health is that married
individuals might differ from unmarried ones along several observed and more
importantly unobserved characteristics. As a result, if healthy individuals select
themselves into marriage in the first place, simple correlations between marriage
and health will capture a combination of selection and protection effects.
We estimate three different models that take unobserved heterogeneity and se-
lection into account. First, we consider a fixed effects model that allows for
individual-specific permanent innate health to be correlated with the treatment
(i.e. with being married). Second, we study a less restrictive model that allows
the individual-specific innate component of health to differ by age. Finally, since
health shocks might also affect probabilities of getting or staying married later
on in life, we consider a dynamic panel data model that controls for the lagged
health status together with permanent innate health.
We start from the following model:
hit = α(ait) + β(ait)mit + x
′
itγ + (ηi + εit), (1)
for i ∈ {1, ..., N} and t ∈ {1, ..., T}, where hit is the health status of individual i
in year t, ait is his/her age, mit is an indicator variable that equals one if the
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individual is married in period t, xit is a vector of individual characteristics,
including gender, race, education, income, children, and year of birth dummies,
and (ηi + εit) is the error term, unobserved by the econometrician. The function
α(ait) is the health curve for single individuals as a function of age, and α(ait) +
β(ait) is the one for married individuals. These functions are non-parametrically
specified. Our main interest is in the marriage health gap, which is given by β(a).
The residual ηi + εit is unobservable to the econometrician. The term εit cap-
tures health innovations, which are assumed to be uncorrelated with observables,
contemporaneously and also in all leads and lags, but potentially autocorrelated
over time (and across individuals within a household). If εit is correlated across
individuals and/or over time, but not correlated with regressors, the consistency
results discussed below still hold, but standard errors need to be corrected appro-
priately. In estimation, we allow for correlation across individuals within a given
household and over time, by clustering the standard errors at the household level.
The unobserved error term also includes an individual-specific permanent com-
ponent ηi. This type of unobserved heterogeneity generates parallel health curves
for different types of individuals, shifted by a different intercept. We interpret
this as a permanent innate health component, which shifts health curves verti-
cally, making them parallel across individuals. If certain types of individuals are
more likely to get married in the first place (or, more generally, there are system-
atic differences in the timing and likelihood of marriage for different types), the
error term (ηi + εit) will be correlated with the regressors, and Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimates will be biased, as we discuss below. Studies in evolu-
tionary biology, for example, suggest that individuals with better innate health
are more attractive mates in the marriage market, as better health is a clear in-
dication of reproductive success. This is summarized in Buss (1994) as follows:
“Our ancestors had access to two types of observable evidence of a woman’s health
and youth: features of physical appearance, such as full lips, clear skin, smooth
skin, clear eyes, lustrous hair and good muscle tone, and features of behavior,
such as bouncy, youthful gait, and animated facial expression, and a high energy
level. These physical cues to youth and health, and hence reproductive capacity,
7 Pointing in the same direction: “From the point of view of a female trying to pick good
genes with which to ally her own, what is she looking for? One thing she wants is evidence of
ability to survive” (Dawkins, 1989, p.157).
constitute the ingredients of male standards of female beauty” (p.53).7
This pattern of self-selection would lead OLS to overestimate the marriage
health gap in Equation (1). Furthermore, the size of the bias would differ at
different ages. Since a majority of individuals eventually gets married at some
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Figure 3. Unobserved Heterogeneity and the Self-Selection Bias: An Example
A. Data generating process
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B. A sample of 10 individuals
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C. OLS estimates
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Note: This figure illustrates the bias from omitting unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation of the
health curves. Panel A presents the data generating process. Married health curves are dark and single
health curves are light. Panel B plots a hypothetical sample of 10 individuals simulated from the data
generating process, all of them with x = x¯ and ε = 0. Types of markers identify individuals. Panel C
shows OLS estimates of the married and single curves on the simulated sample.
point, the bias is likely to be larger at younger ages. We illustrate this bias in
Figure 3. Consider the data generating process described in Figure 3A, which
shows health curves for married (dark brown line) and single (light brown line)
individuals. The curves are drawn with x = x¯, η = 0, and ε = 0. As Figure 3A
shows, this process does not generate a marriage health gap at younger ages, while
it generates a marriage gap in later years. Our choice for particular health curves
in Figure 3A is not random; they approximately reproduce the marriage health
gap we obtain from a fixed effects estimation of Equation (1) on the PSID sample.
As noted above, since innate health η enters as an additive shifter for given xit
and εit, individuals with different η values are represented by health curves that
are parallel to those in Figure 3A and shifted by the corresponding ηi.
Figure 3B shows a simulated sample of 10 individuals generated by the process
just described. Each individual is indicated by a different marker. There is, for
example, an individual with the highest value of η who is always married (marked
by dark brown squares at the top), and another individual with the lowest value
of η who is always single (marked by empty light brown diamonds at the bottom).
In between, there are individuals with different marital histories. The individual,
who is indicated by empty circles, for example, is single before age 45 years and
then he/she gets married. In the generated sample, there is positive self-selection
as individuals with higher η are more likely to get married and do so earlier.
If we average observed health of married and of singles (or, equivalently, we
fit Equation (1) to those data by OLS), we obtain the health curves depicted in
Figure 3C. Given the selection into early marriage by high η individuals, OLS
overestimates the underlying marriage health gap. The health curves obtained
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in Figure 3C intentionally replicate the (unconditional) average health curves by
marital status obtained from the PSID, depicted in Figure 1 in Section II.
A fixed-effects estimation of Equation (1) provides consistent estimates of the
health curves, as long as our assumption of additive separability of η is satisfied.
It is important to note that since α(a) and β(a) are time-varying for a given
individual, as he/she is observed over different ages, identification does not rely
exclusively on individuals who change their marital status. Individuals contribute
to the identification of the shape of married health curves (up to their intercept)
whenever they are married, even if they never switch marital status. Likewise,
whenever they are single, individuals contribute to the identification of the singles
health curve up to the intercept. Changes in marital status thus identify the
gap between single and married intercepts.8 Consequently, identification of the
marriage health gap at a given age, say 60 to 64 years, is not identified exclusively
by individuals who switch marital status within that age range.
As Figure 3C makes clear, we estimate Equation (1) under the assumption that
innate health shifts health curves in a parallel way. It is, however, very likely
that good or bad innate health maps into small differences in observed health
early in the life cycle, while these differences might get magnified as one ages.
In order to allow for age-dependent effects of innate health, we next consider the
following model:
hit = α(ait, ηgi) + β(ait)mit + x
′
itγ + εit, (2)
for i ∈ {1, ..., N} and t ∈ {1, ..., T}, where now α(a, ηg) is the unmarried health
curve for type-g ∈ {1, ..., G} individuals, with G < N , and α(a, ηg) + β(a) is the
curve for married ones. Thus, Equation (2) allows for age-dependent unobserved
heterogeneity that shapes the entire health curves through α(a, ηg).
8 Therefore, individuals who are, for example, always married (like the individual with the
highest η in Figure 3B) contribute to the identification of the shape of the married health curve,
despite not contributing to the identification of the gap between married and single intercepts.
9 While the algorithm often reaches the same global minimum, if initial conditions are very
much off, the algorithm can stop at a local minimum. In our application, we run the algorithm
repeatedly for a 1,000 times starting from random initial guesses for the parameters of the health
curves by type, and 95% of the times we reach the global minimum (up to the fourth decimal).
Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) develop an estimator, to which they refer as
grouped fixed effects, for models with grouped patterns of unobserved heterogene-
ity like the one specified in Equation (2). The estimator optimally groups the N
cross-sectional units into types using a least squares criterion. In particular, it
is based on an iterative routine that starts from an initial guess of parameters,
classifies each individual into the type that provides the smallest mean squared
error based on the parameter guess, and updates the parameters reestimating the
model conditioning on the resulting classification.9
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The intuition for self-selection and identification arguments is analogous to the
one illustrated in Figure 3. The main difference is that now the entire health curve
is allowed to differ by type in a flexible way (over and above the different intercept).
In order to identify such models, however, one needs to set a relatively small
number of types. For example, in line with the results below, high types could
have a higher intercept and a flatter decrease in their health status by age, while
low types could have a lower intercept as well as a more steep health deterioration.
The estimator is described in further detail in Appendix C.
The models described in Equations (1) and (2) both assume that there is no
feedback from health shocks to marriage probabilities, and that all self-selection
occurs through innate unobserved heterogeneity. Health shocks, however, could
affect the probability of getting or staying married in subsequent periods.10 To
account for this type of self-selection, we consider the following transformation of
the model in Equation (1):
hit = ϕhit−1 + α(ait) + β(ait)mit + x′itγ + (ηi + εit), (3)
for i ∈ {1, ..., N} and t ∈ {1, ..., T}. By controlling for lagged health, hit−1, Equa-
tion (3) analyzes the effect of marriage on health innovations. In this case, a
fixed-effects estimation does not deliver consistent estimates, e.g. see Arellano
and Bond (1991). Therefore, we use a generalized method of moments approach,
in the way described in Arellano and Bover (1995), often known as System-GMM.
This procedure delivers consistent estimates if health shocks only affect marriage
probabilities with some lag (so that they are captured by ht−1), but health inno-
vations εit are not correlated with contemporaneous marriage probabilities. This
10 Medical literature documents that health shocks such as cancer, or unhealthy habits such
as heavy drinking and smoking, are associated with divorce. See, for example, Kirchhoff, Yi,
Wright, Warner and Smith (2012) and Torvik, Gustavson, Roysamb and Tambs (2015).
assumption is plausible, since we focus on yearly data and, in reality, marriage
formation and dissolution decisions take some time to execute.
IV. Estimation Results: the Marriage Health Gap
In this section we present OLS and fixed-effects estimates of Equation (1),
grouped-fixed-effects estimates of Equation (2), and system-GMM estimates of
Equation (3). We also show that the main results are robust to different defini-
tions of two key variables, health and marriage.
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A. Main Results
Panel A of Figure 4 presents OLS estimates of β(a) from the PSID (dark blue)
and the MEPS (light blue) samples.11 In estimation, we use five-year age bins,
from 20-24 to 60-64.12 Health, h, is an indicator variable that takes a value of
one whenever the individual is healthy. Control variables, x, include income, gen-
der (female dummy), race (black dummy), education (college dummy), children
(dummies for presence of children in the household of ages 0-3, 4-12, and 13-18
years), and cohort (year of birth dummies).
The results show that after controlling for observable characteristics, there is
a positive and significant difference between the reported health of married and
unmarried individuals. The gap starts at about 3 percentage points at younger
ages (20 to 39 years), and increases continuously for older ages, reaching a peak
of 10 percentage points at age 55 to 59 years in the PSID sample. Similar results
are obtained from the MEPS sample when we estimate the model with the same
controls. The gap is initially small and grows to about 8 percentage points for
55-to-59-years age group. Panel B of Figure 4 shows fixed-effects estimates for the
PSID sample. Fixed-effects estimation reduces the size of the marriage health gap
substantially. Indeed for ages up to 40 years the marriage health gap disappears
completely. After age 40 years, however, the positive effect of marriage on health
starts to show up. At the peak of the gap (between ages 50-59 years), married
individuals are about 5 percentage points more likely to be healthy than unmarried
ones. This is about half of the OLS gap.13
Next, we estimate Equation (2) that allows for age-dependent unobserved het-
erogeneity. We assume that unobserved heterogeneity is summarized by two (high
11 The full set of regression coefficients are shown in Table D1 in Appendix D.
12 Results are robust to different bin widths. Figures plot the mid point of the interval.
13 We also checked whether health curves differ by several socioeconomic characteristics, such
as gender, race, education, the presence of children, and income, as well as by different cohorts.
Our results, which are available upon request, do not show significantly different patterns across
any of these dimensions.
and low innate health) types. Panel A of Figure 5 shows the health curves for
single individuals of each type. It is apparent that two types are clearly sepa-
rated with respect to their health curves. High types, who are about 81.3% of the
sample, have consistently better health at all ages. On the other hand, low-type
individuals, 18.7% of the sample, are less healthy to begin with and their health
deteriorate faster. These results provide evidence of age-dependent patterns of
unobserved heterogeneity in (innate) health.
Panel B of Figure 5 shows the resulting marriage health gap. Marriage health
gap is negligible at younger age (below 40-45 years) and then grows to about 5%
at around ages 50-55 years. This is again about half of the gap estimated by OLS
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Figure 4. Marriage Health Gap: OLS and Fixed-Effects Estimation Results
A. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
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B. Fixed-Effects
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Note: Solid lines show estimated marriage health gaps β(a) from Equation (1). The regression is fitted to
the PSID and the MEPS. Left figure presents estimates from OLS regressions, and right figure presents
fixed-effects estimates. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the
individual is healthy. Control variables include female, black, and college dummies, income, dummies
for 0-3, 4-12, and 13-18 year-old children at home, and year of birth dummies; regressions also estimate
α(a). The horizontal axis indicates age. In estimation, five-year age bins (20-24, through 60-64) are
considered. The center point of the bin is represented in the figure. Weights are used in estimation.
Confidence bands of ± two standard errors around point estimates are computed following the survey
design of each database. Standard errors are clustered at the household level in the PSID.
for these ages. These results are almost identical to those in Panel B of Figure 4.
This is remarkable as they are obtained from two models that are quite differ-
ent. In particular, while the fixed-effects model assumes permanent unobserved
heterogeneity, the grouped-fixed-effects one allows for unobserved heterogeneity
that is age-dependent. Additionally, estimates are obtained from very different
techniques. While the first model is estimated using standard fixed-effects panel
data tools, in the second one we allow for two unobserved types, and we use an
estimation algorithm that classifies individuals into these types to minimize the
predicted squared error for each individual (see Bonhomme and Manresa, 2015).
Finally, Figure 6 presents estimates for Equation (3). While the overall pat-
tern of the marriage health gap is similar to what we obtain from fixed-effects
and grouped-fixed-effects estimates, the marriage health gap is now larger. This
suggests that health innovations are negatively correlated with future marriage
prospects (a negative health shock increases the probability of getting or staying
married in later periods). As a result, by not including lagged health in Equa-
tion (1), we underestimate the effect of marriage on health. Once this bias is
corrected, the effect of marriage on health is estimated to be larger. In Figure 6,
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Figure 5. Marriage Health Gap: Grouped-Fixed-Effects Estimation Results
A. Singles’ Health Curves by Type
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B. Marriage Health Gap
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Note: Left plot shows α(a, ηg), the estimated health curves for unmarried individuals of high and low
health types, and the right plot shows β(a), the estimated marriage health gap, both of them from
Equation (2). The model is fitted to the PSID, implementing the algorithm described in Bonhomme
and Manresa (2015) for two types. The algorithm was started from 1,000 different random points, and
it generally converged to the same minimum. It identified 81.3% healthy-type individuals (12,660),
and 18.7% of unhealthy-type (2,909). The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the
value of one if the individual is healthy. Control variables include female, black, and college dummies,
income, dummies for 0-3, 4-12, and 13-18 year-old children at home, and year of birth dummies. The
horizontal axis indicates age. In estimation, five-year age bins (20-24, through 60-64) are considered.
The center point of the bin is represented in the figure. Weights are used in estimation. Confidence
bands of ± two standard errors are computed clustering standard errors at the household level.
14 OLS and System-GMM deliver similar results. On the one hand, when we compare the
fixed-effects estimation with OLS, we see that not controlling for innate health leads to an
overestimation of the effect of marriage on health. On the other hand, when we compare the
results from the dynamic model with ones obtained from the fixed-effect regression, we see that
not controlling for lagged health results in an underestimation of the effect. These two biases
seem to be of a similar size (and opposite sign), and they cancel each other.
15 There is another reason why these estimates might be conservative. If individuals make
pre-marital investment in health to make themselves more attractive in the marriage market,
the estimated effect of marriage on health will be small as singles health will also be higher due
to these premarital investment. In other words, marriage has an indirect effect on untreated
individuals which makes them look healthier. Lafortune (2013) shows that worse marriage
conditions indeed lead individuals to make higher pre-marital investment in education.
anything, conservative estimates of the effect of marriage on health.15
The results from these three specifications tell a similar story: there is an role
for self-selection in explaining the observed marriage health gap, especially at
earlier ages, while some protective effects of marriage on health remain at older
ages. We next show that this result is robust to different definitions of the two key
variables, health and marriage. In Section V, we then explore both self-selection
marriage health gap is already 5% for ages 40 to 49 years and increases up to 10%
for later years.14 These results suggest that the results in Figures 4 and 5, are, if
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Figure 6. Marriage Health Gap: System-GMM Estimation Results
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Note: The solid line shows the estimated marriage health gap β(a) from the dynamic model in Equa-
tion (3). The regression is estimated by System-GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995) from the PSID for
the subperiod 1985-1997. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of one
if the individual is healthy. Control variables include the lagged dependent variable and a vector of
controls that includes female, black, and college dummies, income, dummies for 0-3, 4-12, and 13-18
year-old children at home, and year of birth dummies; regressions also estimate α(a). The horizontal
axis indicates age. In estimation, five-year age bins (20-24, through 60-64) are considered. The center
point of the bin is represented in the figure. Weights are used in estimation. Confidence bands of ± two
standard errors are computed clustering at the household level.
patterns and the potential remaining protective effects of marriage on health in
further detail.
B. Males versus Female
We next study whether the marriage health gap is different for males and fe-
males. There is a long-held position in the literature that health benefits of
marriage are larger for men than they are for women (see, e.g., the review by
Coombs, 1991). This position seems to be established by empirical studies from
1970s when labor market disparities between men and women were much larger,
and it was conjectured that marriage produced greater stress for women by mak-
ing them economically dependent on their husbands (Williams, 2003). Recent
medical studies, however, report that men and women benefit equally from mar-
riage (see, e.g., Williams, 2003 and Strohschein, 2016). Figure 7 shows our results
for the marriage health gap for males and females. In all specifications, marriage
heath gap is slightly larger for males but the difference is never statistically sig-
nificant. For both genders, there is an important role for self-selection at earlier
ages, while protective effects show up later on.
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Figure 7. Marriage Health Gap: Results by Gender
A. Fixed Effects B. Grouped Fixed Effects C. System GMM
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Note: Solid lines show estimated marriage health gaps β(a) from Equations (1), (2), and (3) respectively,
estimated separately on the samples of males and females. The regression is fitted to the PSID. The
dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the individual is healthy. Control
variables include black and college dummies, income, dummies for 0-3, 4-12, and 13-18 year-old children
at home, and year of birth dummies. The regressions also estimate α(a), α(a, ηgi), and ϕhit−1 + α(a)
respectively. The horizontal axis indicates age. In estimation, five-year age bins (20-24, through 60-64)
are considered. The center point of the bin is represented in the figure. Weights are used in estimation.
Confidence bands of ± two standard errors around point estimates are computed following the survey
design of each database. Standard errors are clustered at the household level in the PSID.
remains the same. Another objective measure of health is the presence of chronic
conditions (such as cancer, hypertension, diabetes, stroke, hearth attack, etc.),
which is provided in the PSID. The right panel of Figure 8 shows the fixed-effects
and grouped-fixed-effects and estimates of the marriage gap obtained from this
health measure.16 The dependent variable is the number of different chronic con-
ditions an individual ever had by any given age. Consistent with the self-reported
and SF12v2 measures of health, the difference between married and single indi-
viduals is very small for younger ages, but as individuals age, the model predicts
that married individuals have a much smaller number of chronic conditions than
singles do. Around ages 50 to 54 years, for example, a married individual is ex-
C. Robustness
The results in Figure 4 are based on self-reported measures of health. The MEPS
contains another measure, SF12v2 (short form 12 version 2), that is constructed
as an index from answers that respondents give to a set of health-related objective
questions. The left panel of Figure 8 replicates the OLS estimates from the MEPS
sample with this measure of health, and show that the basic qualitative picture
16The data on chronic conditions in the PSID are available since 1999 and only biannually.
This renders the estimation of a system-GMM with chronic conditions unfeasible.
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Figure 8. Alternative Health Measures
A. MEPS objective health index
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B. Chronic conditions
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Note: Plotted lines show the estimated marriage health gaps β(a) for two alternative measures of health:
SF12v2 objective index of health (left), estimated by OLS from the MEPS, and the cumulative number
of different chronic conditions suffered by the individual (right), which includes fixed-effects estimates
and group fixed effects estimates as indicated, both obtained from the PSID for the subperiod 1999-
2013. The following chronic conditions are considered: stroke, heart attack, hypertension, diabetes,
cancer, lung disease, arthritis, asthma, memory loss, and learning disorder, as defined in the PSID.
Group fixed effects estimates from the right plot are obtained implementing the algorithm described in
Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) for two types. The algorithm was started from 1,000 different random
points, and in general converged to the same global minimum. The algorithm identified 63% high-
type individuals (9,804), and 37% of low-type (5,765). Control variables include female, black, and
college dummies, income, dummies for 0-3, 4-12, and 13-18 year-old children at home, and year of birth
dummies; regressions also estimate α(a) or α(a, ηg). The horizontal axis indicates age. In estimation,
five-year age bins (20-24, through 60-64) are considered. The center point of the bin is represented in
the figure. Confidence bands of ± two standard errors around point estimates are computed following
the survey design of each database. Standard errors are clustered at the household level in the PSID.
pected to have, all else equal, 0.15 fewer chronic conditions than if he/she was
unmarried. As we summarize in Table B1 in Appendix B, on average individuals
have about 0.73 chronic conditions. Hence, the marriage gap is about 20,5% of the
mean. Again the results from the two estimation strategies give similar results.
We also check whether the way we define married and unmarried individuals
affect the results. In our first check, we would like to understand whether divorce
(in contrast to being never married) has a particularly adverse effect on health.
To this end, we drop divorced agents from the pool of unmarried, and compare
married individuals with those who are never married or widowed. Results in
Panel A of Figure 9, are very much in line with our basic results. Indeed, the
marriage health gap is now slightly larger, which suggests that divorced individuals
have better, not worse, health than those who are never married or widowed. This
could possibly reflects a positive effect of marriage capital (measured as the total
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Figure 9. Alternative Definitions of Married and Single
A. Divorced/separated excluded B. Widowed excluded C. Cohabiting incl. in married
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Note: Solid lines show within-groups estimated marriage health gaps β(a) from Equation (1) for different
definitions of married and unmarried populations: excluding divorced/separated or widowed from the
sample, and including cohabitants in the married group, as indicated. The regression is fitted to the
PSID. Control variables include female, black, and college dummies, income, dummies for 0-3, 4-12,
and 13-18 year-old children at home, and year of birth dummies; regressions also estimate α(a). The
horizontal axis indicates age. In estimation, five-year age bins (20-24, through 60-64) are considered.
The center point of the bin is represented in the figure. Weights are used in estimation. Confidence
intervals of ± two standard errors are computed clustering at the household level.
individuals than to married ones. This would be consistent with Schoenborn (2004), who docu-
ment that “health limitations, conditions, and unhealthy behaviors among adults living with a
partner resembled or exceeded prevalence among adults who are divorced or separated.
V. Exploring Selection and Protection Mechanisms
Results in previous section suggest that both selection of healthy individuals into
marriage at early ages as well as protection and improvement of health within mar-
riage at later ages play a role in generating the marriage health gap observed in the
data. This section explores how selection and protection may show up in the data.
A. Self-Selection into Marriage and Divorce
We start by documenting the relation between permanent innate health and ob-
served individual characteristics. The left panel of Table 2 shows the coefficients
of a regression of when we regress innate health on several individual characteris-
number of years one is married) on health, which we explore further below. Next,
we exclude widows from the pool of single agents (Panel B). In this case, results
are similar to our baseline results. Finally, we consider all cohabitants as married
(Panel C). As documented in Table B1 in Appendix B, this increases the fraction
of married in the PSID from 66% to 72%. Point estimates of the marriage health
gap are now slightly smaller, but not statistically different from baseline results.17
17 The slightly lower effect could be the result of cohabitants being more similar to unmarried
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tics. In the first and second columns, the dependent variable is ηi, the estimated
fixed effects from Equation (1) and Equation (3), while in the third column, it is
a binary variable indicating whether an individual belongs to the healthy type in
Equation (2). All specifications give very similar results. In general, more height,
less weight, college education, being white, and higher income are associated with
higher levels of permanent innate health. There are, however, no significant dif-
ferences by gender, i.e. females do not have higher innate health than males.
Focusing on the first column, additional 10,000$ of income (roughly one third of
a standard reviation) is associated with about 0.03 higher value of ηi, about one-
eigth of standard deviation of ηi (which is about 0.24). Similarly, being black is
associated with 0.063 lower value of ηi, about one-fourth of a standard deviation,
and being college graduated is associated with 0.053 additional points, about one
fifth of a standard deviation. In panel B of Table 2, we repeat the same exer-
cise for chronic conditions. Individuals experiencing a chronic condition at one
point along the life cycle are also much less likely to have higher levels of innate
health. Having a stroke, for example, is associated with 18.4 percentage points
lower probability of belonging to the healthy type.
Table 2—Correlation between Innate Health and Observable Characteristics
A. Demographic characteristics
Innate permanent Probabil.
health (ηi) healthy
Fixed System- type
effects GMM (ηg(i))
Height (inches) 0.009 0.004 0.013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Weight (pounds) -0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female 0.008 0.006 0.007
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
College 0.053 -0.028 0.080
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Black -0.063 -0.046 -0.056
(0.011) (0.010) (0.017)
Income 0.003 0.001 0.004
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Constant -0.508 -0.182 0.171
(0.073) (0.081) (0.129)
B. Chronic conditions
Innate permanent Probabil.
health (ηi) healthy
Fixed System- type
effects GMM (ηg(i))
Stroke -0.135 -0.082 -0.184
(0.027) (0.026) (0.042)
Hypertension -0.034 -0.006 -0.053
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009)
Diabetes -0.101 -0.041 -0.143
(0.011) (0.011) (0.019)
Cancer 0.002 -0.002 -0.018
(0.011) (0.009) (0.020)
Lung disease -0.123 -0.094 -0.173
(0.013) (0.015) (0.021)
Heart attack -0.057 -0.048 -0.084
(0.016) (0.017) (0.029)
Arthritis -0.074 -0.039 -0.115
(0.008) (0.007) (0.013)
Asthma -0.049 -0.032 -0.059
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014)
Memory loss -0.206 -0.131 -0.320
(0.031) (0.027) (0.041)
Learning disord. -0.116 -0.095 -0.183
(0.017) (0.022) (0.030)
Constant 0.042 0.031 0.937
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Note: The table presents the coefficients of a regression of innate health on the listed characteristics.
Innate permanent health (ηi) refers to the estimated fixed effect from Equations (1) and (3) as indicated.
Probability healthy type (ηg(i)) refers to a dependent variable that is a dummy variable that takes the
value of one if the individual is of the healthy type as defined in the estimation of Equation (2). The
standard deviation of η̂i is 0.244 for fixed effects, and 0.209 for System-GMM. Regressions are fitted to
the PSID. Standard errors, clustered at the household level, are reported in parentheses.
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fraction of individuals who belong to the healthy group by their marital status.
Consistent with the results in the upper panel, a smaller fraction of individuals
belong to the high health type and innate health is more unequally distributed
among never married individuals.
These patterns are consistent with selection of healthy individuals into marriage.
Consider a world in which innate health is observable and singles look for healthy
partners. In such a world, given large variance of health among never married indi-
viduals, those with good health wait until they find a suitable partner with better
health. As a result, the average innate health among married will be higher, while
the dispersion of health will be smaller (as in our data). Those with bad health
are unattractive partners in the marriage market and those with better health are
more selective. Hence, in such a world, health is a good predictor of entry into
marriage and there will be positive assortative mating by health among married
individuals.18 As we discuss next, the data supports both of these predictions.
18 There is evidence that husbands and wives sort by smoking behavior as well as by body-
We first explore whether health is a good predictor of entry into marriage in the
PSID. We focus on individuals who are never married by age 25 years and analyze
how innate permanent health (either the estimated fixed effect from Equation (1)
or Equation (3), η̂i, or the health type in Equation (2)) affect their probability of
getting married between ages 30 and 40 years. To this end, we first categorize each
individual as a high or low innate health type. The estimation of Equation (2)
indicates that 81.3% of all individuals in our sample are high health types. As a
result, for the fixed-effect and system-GMM estimates, we also label the top 81.3%
and bottom 18.7% of individuals in the innate health distribution as high and low
health types, respectively. Next, for individuals who are never married by age 25
years, we calculate the difference between high and low types in their probability
of getting married between ages 30 and 40 years. The results are shown in the
first three columns of Table 4. The first column shows that an individual who
is unmarried by age 25 years has about 41% chance of getting married by ages
mass index. See Clark and Etile´ (2006), Oreffice and Quintana-Domenque (2010) and Chiappori,
Oreffice and Quintana-Domenque (2012, 2013). Domingue, Fletcher, Conley and Boardman
(2014) compare genetic similarities between married and non-couple (random) pairs in the pop-
ulation and find genetic assortative mating.
We next document how innate permanent health is distributed among married
and unmarried individuals. The upper panel of Table 3 shows innate health
differences between individuals who are never and ever married by ages 30 and
40 years, measured by recovered individual fixed effects from Equations (1) and
(3). For both ages, the average innate health of ever-married individuals is higher
than never-married ones, but the variance is higher among never married. In the
lower panel of Table 3, we report the mean and the standard deviiation of the
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Table 3—Empirical Distribution of Innate Health
Individuals that at age [...] are [...]:
Age 30 Age 40
Never married Ever married Never married Ever married
Fixed
effects
System-
GMM
Fixed
effects
System-
GMM
Fixed
effects
System-
GMM
Fixed
effects
System-
GMM
Innate permanent health (ηi):
Mean -0.027 -0.005 0.008 0.002 -0.039 -0.008 0.008 -0.000
Standard dev. 0.204 0.159 0.163 0.134 0.227 0.185 0.193 0.154
Num. of indiv. 2,207 1,159 4,827 3,330 810 670 4,963 4,353
Age30 Age 40
Never married Ever married Never married Ever married
Innate health type (ηg(i)):
Fraction of high type 0.845 0.895 0.824 0.884
Standard deviation 0.131 0.094 0.145 0.102
Number of individuals 1,806 4,249 642 4,264
Note: The table reports statistics that summarize the empirical distribution of recovered fixed effects ηi
in Equations (1), and (3), and of innate health types ηg(i) in Equation (2) for different groups of
individuals. Each block includes individuals that, at the listed age, are never married and ever married
as indicated. Statistics are computed from the PSID. Weights are used in the estimation. Three year
windows are constructed around the indicated age to increase the number of observations.
30 and 40 years if she belongs to the low health type. The probability of getting
married, however, is increased by about 19 percentage points if she was a high
health type. The results with system-GMM and grouped-fixed-effect estimates
Table 4—Health and Marriage/Divorce Probabilities
Probability that never married by Probability that married at age 25
age 25 are married at age 30-40 are divorced at age 30-40
Types defined Fixed System Grouped Fixed System Grouped
from: effects GMM Fixed Eff. effects GMM Fixed Eff.
Low-type probability 0.413 0.540 0.429 0.333 0.388 0.331
(0.041) (0.062) (0.042) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018)
High-type/Low-type prob. gap 0.194 0.046 0.175 -0.105 -0.159 -0.101
(0.044) (0.064) (0.044) (0.018) (0.023) (0.019)
Note: The left panel presents the coefficients of three regressions of a dummy variable that takes thevalue
of one if the individual is married at some point between ages 30 and 40 on a constant and a dummy
variable that equals one if the individual is of high type based on the fixed effects recovered from the
estimation of Equations (1), (3), and (2) —for the first two, a high type is defined as an individual
at a percentile above the fraction of high types recovered in the third— fitted on the sub-sample of
individuals who had never been married by age 25. The right panels present analogous coefficients for
a dependent variable that equals one if the individual gets divorced at some point between ages 30 and
40 and it is estimated on the sub-sample of individuals that are married by age 25. These regressions
are fitted to the PSID. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
of innate health tell a similar story: healthy individual have higher chances of
getting married. We implement an analogous analysis for divorce, i.e. we look at
individuals who are married at age 25 years and analyze how their innate health
correlates with the probability of getting a divorce by ages 30-40 years. We follow
a similar strategy to split individuals between high and low health types. The
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columns fourth to sixth of Table 4 shows the results. A 25-year old married low
health type individual has about 33 to 38% chances of getting a divorce by ages
30 to 40 years. This probability declines by 10 to 15% points, i.e. by about a
third, if the individual is a high health type.
B. Assortative Mating by Health
The results in the previous section indicate that healthy individuals are more
likely to get and stay married. The marriage market outlined above would also pre-
dict assortative mating in health. To explore this possibility, the top left panel of
Table 5 shows the contingency table for marriages formed by husbands and wives
from different quintiles of the innate health distribution, together with marginal
Table 5—Contingency Tables: Assortative Mating by Innate Health
Innate permanent health — Fixed effects (ηi)
Observed marital sorting % Random matching %
Wife Wife
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Marginal
H
u
sb
a
n
d
1 8.1 3.0 2.4 2.4 2.1 3.2 2.5 4.5 4.8 3.0 18.0
2 2.6 3.2 3.1 3.4 1.7 2.5 1.9 3.5 3.8 2.3 14.1
3 2.5 2.5 14.7 5.5 0.7 4.7 3.5 6.5 7.0 4.3 26.0
4 2.6 3.3 4.2 12.8 3.6 4.8 3.6 6.6 7.1 4.4 26.5
5 2.1 1.7 0.5 2.7 8.4 2.8 2.1 3.9 4.1 2.5 15.4
Marginal 18.0 13.6 25.0 26.8 16.5 18.0 13.6 25.0 26.8 16.5 100.0
Innate permanent health — System-GMM (ηi)
Observed marital sorting % Random matching %
Wife Wife
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Marginal
H
u
sb
a
n
d
1 8.9 2.7 2.3 2.6 2.7 3.7 4.2 4.5 4.3 2.5 19.2
2 2.6 9.8 4.6 3.3 0.8 4.1 4.6 4.9 4.7 2.7 21.0
3 2.4 4.9 10.0 4.1 0.7 4.3 4.8 5.2 5.0 2.9 22.2
4 2.9 3.6 5.4 10.2 2.4 4.8 5.3 5.8 5.5 3.2 24.6
5 2.7 0.7 1.2 2.1 6.3 2.5 2.8 3.1 2.9 1.7 13.1
Marginal 19.5 21.8 23.5 22.3 12.9 19.5 21.8 23.5 22.3 12.9 100.0
Innate health type (ηg(i))
Observed Random
sorting % matching %
Wife Wife
Husband Low High Low High Marginal
Low 5.7 8.2 2.0 11.9 13.9
High 8.6 77.5 12.3 73.8 86.1
Marginal 14.3 85.7 14.3 85.7 100.0
Note: In the left columns of the two top panels, each cell gives the observed percentage of married
households in which husbands and wifes lie in each indicated quintile of innate permanent health (η̂i)
estimated from Equations (1) and (3) respectively). In the right columns of each panel, each cell
gives the predicted percentage from multiplying marginal distributions of husbands and wives, which
are reported, respectively, at the last column and row. The bottom panel provides similar statistics
computed for the innate health types (η̂g(i)) obtained from the estimation of Equation (2).
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distributions of innate health for husbands and wives. Marriages in which both
husbands and wives are from the bottom (top) health quintiles, for example, are
about 8.1% (8.4%) of all marriages. By construction, the sum of all entries is
100% in a contingency table and due to positive assortative mating, almost half,
47.2%, of all the entries are along the diagonal. How would the contingency table
look like if the matching was completely random by innate health? This is shown
in the top right panel of Table 5. Entries in the random contingency table are
obtained as a product of husbands’ and wives’ marginal distributions. The contin-
gency table with random matching looks very different than the actual one. With
random matching, there would be only 3.2% (in contrast to 8.1%) of marriages
between husbands and wives from the bottom quintile. The fraction of marriages
between husbands and wives from the top quintile would decline even more, from
8.4% to 2.5%. Overall, if the matching was random, the sum of diagonal elements
in the contingency table would be 21.2%, a 26 percentage points decline from the
observed 47.2%. The middle panel presents the same results using innate health
measured estimates from Equation Equation (3), while the lower panels of Table 5
repeats the same exercise using the two types (high and low) from Equation (2).
Again individuals are more likely to marry someone from their own health type.19
Table 6 shows that the simple correlation coefficient between innate permanent
health of husbands and wives is about 0.30 to 0.37 (as a comparison, the one
for years of education among husbands and wives is about 0.5).20 When we
control for education and race (by regressing recovered innate health, η̂i, on these
controls and looking at the correlations between residuals), the correlation remains
almost unchanged. Even when we add a measure of permanent income (predicted
fixed effects from a regression of taxable individual income on education, age,
age squared, marriage and year dummies) as a further control, innate permanent
health is still highly correlated between husbands and wives (about 0.28 to 0.32).
Since health status in the PSID is reported by the household head for both
himself/herself and his/her spouse, one might wonder whether these correlations
simply reflect this particular feature of the data collection.21 In order to ad-
dress this potential concern, we repeat our exercise with innate health estimates
obtained using the presence of chronic conditions as a measure of health in Equa-
19 Table E1 in Appendix E repeats the same exercises with innate health measures obtained
from the regressions that use the number of chronic as a dependent variable with similar results.
20 For the evidence on assortative mating by education and the related literature in economics,
see Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov and Santos (2014). Schwartz (2013) provides a review of the
literature in sociology.
21Banks, Kelly and Smith (2014) highlight this point. Using health data from the English
Longitudinal Survey of Aging (ELSA) and the American Health and Retirement Survey (HRS),
where health is reported by each individual, they still find that couples have similar health status
and healthy behavior along several dimensions.
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Table 6—Correlation of Husband’s and Wife’s Innate Permanent Health
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed System- Fixed System- Fixed System-
Permanent health (ηi) from: Effects GMM Effects GMM Effects GMM
Self-reported health 0.374 0.302 0.347 0.295 0.318 0.279
(0.019) (0.025) (0.020) (0.025) (0.019) (0.025)
Chronic conditions 0.221 0.206 0.191
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
College and race No Yes Yes
Permanent income No No Yes
Note: The table reports conditional correlation coefficients between husband and wife’s estimated innate
permanent health (ηi from Equations (1)and (3)). The first row corresponds to the baseline regression,in
which the self-reported measure of health is used in the regression. The second row is computed using
the number of chronic conditions as a dependent variable, as in Figure 8. To control for college and race,
we introduce dummies for individuals and spouses having a college degree and being black, as well as
the corresponding interactions. For the permanent income, we include husband’s, wife’s, and interacted
individual fixed effects obtained from a regression of taxable individual income on years of education,
age, age squared, marriage, and year dummies. All correlations are estimated from the PSID. Weights
are used in the estimation. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis.
tion (1) (second row of Table 6). Even if reported by the household head, chronic
conditions, unlike a subjective measure of health, are much less likely to result
in spurious correlations. We find that the correlation between innate healths of
husbands and wives is again significant (estimated value is 0.22 in this case, which
is while still large, somewhat smaller than 0.37 above). Moreover, the correlation
remains significant when we control for education, race and permanent income.
C. Healthy Behavior
What factors can explain the protective effect of marriage on health? This
section documents that married individuals are more likely to engage in healthy
behavior than unmarried ones. Figure 10 shows differences between the proba-
bilities that married and unmarried individuals do preventive health checks. The
figure shows coefficients form regressions similar to Equation (1), where the depen-
dent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the individual undertakes
a particular check at a given age. This regression is fitted to the MEPS.
The results show that there are significant differences between married and
single individuals for all categories of preventive care. Married individuals around
ages 50 to 54 years, for example, are about 6 percentage points more likely to
check their cholesterol or have a prostate or breast examination. Note that these
differences come from regressions that control for education and income. Hence,
the effect of marriage on healthy behavior goes beyond the well documented effect
(see e.g. Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010) of education on healthy behavior.
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Why would married individuals be more likely to do preventive care? One
possible factor, which is well documented in the medical literature, is that having
a partner encourages individuals to follow up on medical appointments, check-ups,
etc.22 Another factor, which we focus on in the next subsection, is the fact that
married individuals are more likely to have health insurance than unmarried are.
Differences between married and unmarried individuals in healthy behavior are
also reflected in their medical expenditures. To analyze differences in medical ex-
penditures, we specify the conditional median of the total medical expenditure to
be given by a similar expression to the right hand side of Equation (1).23 Panel A
22 There is a large medical literature that documents the link between marriage and specific
health outcomes. In an interview to CNN, Dr. Paul L. Nguyen, summarizing his research
published in Aizer, Chen, McCarthy, Mendu, Koo, Wilhite, Graham, Choueiri, Hoffman, Martin,
Hu and Nguyen (2013), states that “You are going to nag your wife to go get her mammograms.
You are going to nag your husband to go get his colonoscopy.... If you are on your own, nobody
is going to nag you.” Interview available at http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/2013/09/23/
marriage-may-improve-cancer-survival-odds/?hpt=he_c2, accessed on December 6, 2013.
See Waite and Gallagher (2000) for further evidence on what they call “the virtues of nagging”.
23 Similarly, we consider regressions for mean expenditures as opposed to median, which
of Figure 11 shows our estimates of the marriage gap in median health expendi-
ture estimated from the MEPS. Results suggest that median health expenditure
of married individuals aged below 40 years is around 40-60$ larger per year than
that of unmarried individuals at the same age range. This gap is quite significant
and represents about 12% of the median medical expenditure by individuals below
age 40 years (about 420$). At older ages, though, unmarried individuals spend
more than married ones; at ages 50-59 years, median expenditure of unmarried
individuals is around 100-110$ larger. This is about 6.5% of the median medical
expenditure for this age group (about 1,600$).
This higher expenditure by married individuals at earlier ages may be due to
deliver very similar results, with a different scale.
preventive motives, while the higher expenditure by unmarried at older ages may
be due to curative motives, as a result of worse health. To further explore this
hypothesis, we estimate marriage expenditure gaps for different health statuses.
In particular, we extend the median expenditure model to account for heteroge-
neous expenditure curves for different health levels. Panel B of Figure 11 presents
median regression estimates of the marriage health expenditure gap for healthy
and unhealthy individuals. Married individuals consistently spend more when
they are healthy, which is in line with the fact that they are more likely to do pre-
ventive checks. In contrast, unmarried individuals spend substantially more than
married ones when they are unhealthy, which suggests that when the unmarried
are unhealthy, they are more likely to face serious (and expensive) conditions.24
24Ozkan (2014) documents similar life-cycle patterns for medical expenditure among poor
and rich individuals
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Finally, we check whether marriage is associated with healthy habits. We focus
on smoking, a key health factor. In particular, we look at all individuals who
were smokers in 1999 and document how many of them quit smoking between
Figure 10. Preventive Health Checks and Marital Status
A. Dental check
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B. Cholesterol check
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C. Complete check
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D. Flu shot
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E. Prostate exam
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F. Pap smear
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G. Breast examination
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H. Mammography
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Note: Plotted lines show OLS estimates of the marriage gap in the probability of doing preventive
checks. These differential curves are obtained from a regression that is similar to (1) but where the
dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the individual did the indicated
preventive check in previous years. The following preventive checks are considered: dental check at least
once every year; cholesterol check, general physical examination, flu shot, prostate examination, Pap
smear, breast examination, and mammography at least once in the last two years. The equation is fitted
to data from the MEPS. Control variables include female, black, and college dummies, income, dummies
for 0-3, 4-12, and 13-18 year-old children at home, and year of birth dummies, as well as current health,
health insurance (public and private insurance dummies) and total health expenditures; regressions also
estimate probability curve for singles. Weights are used in the estimation. The horizontal axis indicates
age. In estimation, five-year age bins (20-24 through 60-64) are considered. The center point of the bin
is represented in the figure. Dotted lines indicate ± two standard errors confidence bands around point
estimates, which are Taylor linearized using survey stratification design in the MEPS.
1999 and 2013 conditional on their marital transitions.25 As Table 7 shows, a
single individual is about 23 percentage points points more likely to quit smoking
if he/she gets married than if he/she stays single (53% versus 30%); additionally,
a majority (about 74%) of singles who get married and quit smoking do so while
they are married. Likewise, a married individual is more likely to quit smoking if
he/she stays married than if he/she becomes single (41% versus 31%).
25 Note that Table 7 shows a small but positive probability of quitting smoking while married
in single to single transitions (0.005). This is so because in the 1999-2013 period individuals can
transit into marriage and back to single, and quit smoking during the period they are married.
The same logic applies to quitting smoking while single in married to married transitions (0.007).
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Figure 11. Median Health Expenditures and Marital Status
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B. Heterogeneous effects by health level
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Note: Solid line in the left plot shows the marriage gap in median health expenditures obtained from
a regression to Equation (1), but with total health expenditures as the dependent variable. Solid
lines in the right plot shows estimated heterogeneous marriage gaps in median expenditures by health
level (healthy, dark blue, and unhealthy, light blue). Control variables include female, black, and
college dummies, income, dummies for 0-3, 4-12, and 13-18 year-old children at home, and year of
birth dummies, as well as health insurance (public and private insurance dummies); regressions also
estimate median expenditure curves for singles in each health level. The regressions are estimated from
the MEPS. The horizontal axis indicates age. In estimation, five-year age bins (20-24 through 60-64)
are considered. The center point of the bin is represented in the figure. Dotted lines represent ± two
bootstrapped standard error confidence bands.
Table 7—Probability of Quitting Smoking and Marital Transitions
Probability of Probability of quitting smoking...
quitting smoking while married while single
Single → Single 0.298 0.005 0.293
(0.024) (0.003) (0.024)
Single → Married 0.526 0.390 0.135
(0.050) (0.049) (0.034)
Married → Single 0.312 0.084 0.228
(0.045) (0.027) (0.041)
Married → Married 0.414 0.407 0.007
(0.025) (0.025) (0.004)
Note: The table presents the probability that an individual quits smoking between 1999 and 2013
conditional on smoking in 1999, by marital transition. These probabilities are calculated from the PSID.
Weights are used in the estimation. In the left column, the numerator is the number of individuals in
a given marital transition that were nonsmokers either in 2013 or in the last year for which smoking
information is available, and were smokers in 1999. The denominator is the number of individuals in the
indicated marital transition who were smokers in 1999. In the right panel, the numerator is restricted
to individuals that were married/single in the first year they are observed as nonsmokers after their last
smoking spell. The total number of observations is 1,373. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Figure 12. Health Insurance, Health, and Marital Status
A. Fraction uninsured
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Note: Thick lines in the left plot show the weighted fraction of married and unmarried males and females
that are not covered by any health insurance (public or private). Solid lines in the right plot are OLS
estimates of the marriage health gap for insured and uninsured individuals. Results are obtained from
the MEPS. In the right figure, control variables include female, black, and college dummies, income,
dummies for 0-3, 4-12, and 13-18 year-old children at home, and year of birth dummies; regressions
also estimate health curves for singles with and without insurance. The horizontal axis indicates age.
In estimation, age is grouped in five-year bins (20-24 through 60-64) and the center point of the bin is
graphed. Dotted lines indicate ± two standard errors confidence bands around point estimates, which
are Taylor linearized computed following the survey stratification design.
20 and 64 years old, do not have any public or private health insurance. Panel A in
Figure 12 shows how health insurance status differ by marital status for males and
females. For both genders, unmarried individuals are more likely to be uninsured
document that changes in health insurance status has a large effect on health care utilization.
Overall, these results suggest that marriage goes together with healthy behav-
ior. Even after controlling for observables (most importantly income, education
and health insurance) preventive health care, measured both by frequency of pre-
ventive medical checks and by health expenditure while healthy, is more prevalent
among married individuals than it is among singles. Marriage is also associated
with a higher probability of quitting smoking.26
D. Health Insurance
Health insurance status is a key determinant of health care utilization in the
United States.27 In the MEPS sample, about 16% of individuals, who are between
( )
26Cole, Kim and Krueger (2014) evaluate the short and long-run effects of the Affordable
Heath Care Act. In their model, individuals’ incentives to have a healthy life style, which are
affected by the availability health insurance, play a key role.
27 See e.g. Anderson, Dobkin and Gross (2012) and Finkelstein, Taubman, Wright, Bernstein,
Gruber, Newhouse, Allen, Baicker and the Oregon Health Study Group (2012). Both papers
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than married ones. The gap is, however, larger for males. At ages 45 to 49 years,
for example, about 10% of married individuals, male or female, do not have any
health insurance. The fraction of uninsured among the unmarried of the same age
is less than 20% for females, while it is higher than 25% for males.28 The smaller
gap for females reflects the effect of Medicaid that provides health insurance for
children and their parents, in particular single mothers, in low-income families. In
the MEPS sample, 9.0% and 17.6% of unmarried males and females have public
health insurance, respectively.
Panel B in Figure 12 documents how medical insurance affects the marriage
28 Bernstein, Cohen, Brett and Bush (2008), using, National Health Interview Survey, report
that 13% of married women between ages 25 and 64 years were uninsured in contrast to 21% of
unmarried women of the same age in 2007. For characteristics of uninsured population in the
U.S., see Kaiser Family Foundation (2012).
Figure 13. Health Accumulation Through Marriage
A. Health Capital Accum. from Marriage
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Note: The left figure shows fixed-effect estimates of the health capital accumulated from marriage from
a modified version of equation (1) in which the married dummy m is replaced by the number of years
an individual have been married (zero if never married). Estimates are done with the PSID. The right
figure plots the predicted marriage health gap for individuals married at age 25 and at age 40. Control
variables include female, black, and college dummies, income, dummies for 0-3, 4-12, and 13-18 year-old
children at home, and year of birth dummies; regressions also estimate the health curve for singles. The
horizontal axis indicates age. In estimation, five-year age bins (20-24 through 60-64) are considered and
the center point of the bin is graphed. Dotted lines are ± two standard errors confidence bands around
point estimates, clustered at the household level.
health gap. We report OLS estimates of heterogeneous health curves for individ-
uals with (dark blue) and without (light blue) health insurance. For individuals
with health insurance, the results are similar to what we document in Panel A
of Figure 4 for the MEPS sample. Married individuals are healthier and the es-
timated health gap grows by age. For uninsured individuals, however, we do not
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find any significant health gap between married and unmarried. These results
suggest that the availability of health insurance is an important facilitator for
positive effects of health on marriage.
E. Health Accumulation Through Marriage
Finally, we investigate whether the benefits of marriage on health are cumula-
tive, i.e. whether the duration of marriage matters. In Panel A of Figure 13, we
show results from a regression that is very similar to Equation (1) except that
mit is replaced by a measure of marriage capital, defined as the total number of
years an individual has been married by year t.29 Hence β(a) now measures the
29 Independent of whether the person is married to the same partner.
effect of one extra year of being married at a given age a on the probability of
being healthy. The effect of an extra year of marriage is positive and significant
and roughly constant after ages 35-39 years: having accumulated 10 extra years of
marriage increases the probability of being healthy by about 3 percentage points.
At earlier ages, the estimated effects are negligible.
Based on estimates from Panel A, in Panel B we show predictions for two possi-
ble marital histories for an average person and their cumulative effects on health.
The red (dark) line shows the predicted marriage health gap for a person who gets
married at age 25 years and stay married afterwards compared to someone who
never gets married. Hence, the simulated line is simply the cumulative sum of the
estimates in Panel A. Consistent with our estimates in Section IV, marriage does
not contribute to better health in early ages, but a health gap starts to emerge af-
ter around age 40 years. By ages 55-60 years, this individual is about 5 percentage
points more likely to be healthy compared to someone who has never been mar-
ried. Furthermore, since the effect of marriage on health appear only after around
age 40 years, an individual who gets married at age 40 years, the pink (light) line,
enjoys almost the same benefits from marriage compared to the individual who
marries at age 25 years. This is very reassuring, since although they rely on a
different estimation strategy, these simulations produce almost identical results to
our estimates from Figures 4 and 5. Hence, it provides interesting insight for the
interpretation of our main results in Section IV.
VI. Conclusions
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Medi-
cal Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to document differences in health between
married and unmarried individuals. After controlling for observables (education,
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income, race and gender), there exists a marriage health gap of about 10 per-
centage points in both data sets. We estimate the marriage health gap as the
difference between health curves for married and single individuals, nonparamet-
rically specified as a function of age. Allowing for heterogeneity in innate health
(both permanent and age-dependent), our results suggest that the marriage health
gap disappears for younger ages (20-39 years), while a positive gap of 5 percent-
age points remains for older ages (50-59 years). We interpret these results as
evidence that self-selection into marriage drives the observed marriage health gap
at younger ages, while, at older ages, an important fraction of the observed gap
is explained by protective effects of marriage on health.
We provide detailed evidence of self-selection patterns in the data, and on dif-
ferent mechanisms through which marriage exerts a beneficial effect on health.
We observe that the distribution of innate permanent health of married individ-
uals has a higher mean and lower variance than that of unmarried individuals.
This would be consistent with a marriage search model in which innate health is
observable. Such model implies positive assortative mating by innate health, and
innate health is a good predictor of early entry into marriage. The data supports
both of these predictions. On the other hand, we document that married individ-
uals are much more likely to engage in preventive care and that the total years of
being married (not just current marital status) has a positive effect on health. We
interpret these results as indicators of better health production within marriage.
We find that health insurance plays an important role in this difference.
We close the paper by two comments for future research. First, the results in
this paper suggest that the availability of health insurance is an important factor
for the positive effects of health on marriage. As a result, it will be interesting
to extend the analysis to countries where public health insurance systems differ
significantly from the U.S. The British Household Panel Survey or the German
Socioeconomic Panel, which contain health data comparable to the PSID, can
be used to this end. Second, a growing literature highlights how household and
family structure might be critical to understand key questions in macroeconomics
and public finance —Doepke and Tertilt (2016) and Greenwood, Guner and Van-
denbroucke (2017) provide recent reviews. Models with two-earner households
are used in this literature to understand the key life-cycle decisions, such as con-
sumption, savings, and labor supply, as well as to assess how households reacts
to changes in public policy. Our results in this paper show that household struc-
ture (who is married, who is single and who is married with whom) might also
be critical to understand health profiles along the life-cycle. Thus, incorporating
health production with an explicit model of household formation can be critical
to evaluate health policies.
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Appendix A: Data Description and Variable Definitions
A1. Sample Selection
Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) The Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) is administered by the Survey Research Center in the Institute
for Social Research at the University of Michigan. The study began in 1968
with a nationally representative sample of over 18,000 individuals living in 5,000
families in the United States. Extensive demographic and economic data on these
individuals and their descendants have been collected continuously since then,
yearly until 1997 and biannually after that. The PSID started to collect data on
health in 1984. We use data from 1984 to 2013 (the latest year of the survey).
The analysis is based on the core PSID sample. While the PSID has extensive
data on heads and spouses, available data for other household members is limited.
Our analysis focuses on heads and spouses based on “sequence number” 1 (head)
or 2 (wife).
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) The Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey began in 1996 and it is the most complete source of data on the cost and
use of health care and health insurance coverage in the United States. The survey
has two major components: the Household Component and the Insurance Com-
ponent. We use the Household Component, which contains extensive information
on demographic characteristics, health conditions, health status, usage of medical
services, access to care, satisfaction with care, health insurance coverage, income,
and employment, at both individual and household levels, supplemented by infor-
mation from their medical providers. The survey has a rotating panel structure
in which each individual is interviewed 5 times during a 2-year period and then
replaced. The sample includes about 31,000 individuals per year, with some vari-
ation across years, and it is representative of the U.S. population. As we do not
exploit the short panel dimension of the data set, for each year we consider the
cross-section of available individuals. Some of the variables are only available at a
yearly basis. Others are available at each of the five interviews over the two-year
period. In the latter case, for each individual, we consider his/her first interview
of the year. We use survey years 1996 to 2009.
Both in the PSID and in the MEPS, we clean our samples by dropping obser-
vations that have no compete information on self-reported health, marital status,
gender, race, or income. We focus on working-age individuals, so we consider
individuals aged 20 to 64.
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A2. Variable Definitions
Self-Reported Health Our main health variable is constructed from the re-
ported self-rated health. Individuals rate their health as “excellent”, “very good”,
“good”, “fair” or “poor”. We create a health dummy where 1 (healthy) corre-
sponds to the first three grades, and 0 (unhealthy) to the other two.
Marital Status Marital status is defined as one of four possible status as re-
ported by individuals: “married”, “divorced/separated”, “widowed”, “separated”
and “never married”. In the PSID, if a respondent reported to be widowed,
divorced or separated in a previous period, but reports to be never married in
current one, he/she is assigned his/her previously-reported marital status. The
MEPS contains two questions on marital status: “what is your current marital
status?” and “what was your marital status in previous round” (which means
after the previous interview, but before the current one). Whenever available,
marital status is determined based on the first question; the second question is
used otherwise.
Age We create five-year age bins: 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, etc.
Gender Gender is self-reported.
Race Based on self-reported race, we create a “black” dummy, which we use
as a control in most of the regressions. Additionally, we also create a “white”
dummy that is used when we compute heterogeneous health gaps by race (Fig-
ures 2 and B1).
Education Our main education variable is a dummy that takes the value of
one if the individual received a college degree, based on the responses to “did you
receive a college degree?” or “did your wife receive a college degree?” in the PSID
or “highest degree attained” in the MEPS (in which case, college degree is defined
as bachelor’s degree or more). In the PSID, if a person reported that he/she has
a college degree in a previous year, but the answer to this question is missing in
a later year, we use previous answer to fill the missing observation. In the last
column of Table 6, we use the number of years of education of the individual
to compute our measure of permanent income. This information is based on the
response to the question “what is the highest grade or year of school that you have
completed?”. For that particular exercise, observations with DK/NA codes are
dropped. Whenever possible, missing or zero observations are imputed from valid
answers to this questions from preceding or following interviews. If a respondent
reports a lower completed grade in an interview after he/she reports a higher one
in a previous interview, we consider the higher value.
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Children Presence of children in the household is identified from the question
“children under 18 in the family unit”. From the record of each child in the
household, we identify their age and create dummy variables for the presence of
children of the ages 0 to 3, 4 to 12, and 13 to 18.
Income Our definition of income is “taxable income” in the PSID or “total
person’s income” in the MEPS. For couples (married or cohabiting), we calculate
household taxable income by summing the total taxable incomes of the head
and the spouse and then divide the total taxable income by 2. This variable is
deflated using 2005 Consumer Price Index (CPI), obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
Marital capital (PSID) Marital capital is defined as the sum of the durations
of all (past and present) marriages. Duration of a given marriage is calculated
as the difference between either the year of divorce/separation/widowhood or the
current year (depending on whether the marriage ended or is ongoing), and the
starting year of the marriage. This information is obtained from the Marriage
History Supplement of the PSID.
Chronic conditions (PSID) We consider the following chronic conditions:
stroke, hypertension, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart attack, heart disease,
arthritis, asthma, memory loss, and learning disorder. For each of them, we cre-
ate a dummy that equals one if you ever suffered that condition. Our chronic
conditions variable is defined as the sum of these dummies across all conditions.
Hence, it measures the number of different conditions the individual ever suffered.
Smoking (PSID) An individual is classified as a smoker if he answered the
question “do you smoke cigarettes?” affirmatively or the household head did so for
the question “does your wife smoke cigarettes?”. Smoking transitions conditional
on marital transitions are then computed as described in the main text.
Cohabitation (PSID) Cohabitants are identified from the variable “relation-
ship to head”. This variable takes the following values: 10 (head), 20 (legal wife),
90 (legal husband of head, if in rare cases the head is a female), 22 (female cohabi-
tant who has lived with the head for 12 months or more), 88 (first-year cohabitant,
boyfriend or girlfriend, of head). To identify cohabitants we use codes 22 and 88.
Objective Health Index (MEPS) We use the Physical Summary Component
of the Short Form 12 version 2 (SF-12v2) as an objective index of health. In
2000, 2001, and 2002, MEPS used Version 1 of the SF-12. Therefore for these
years, Version 1 scores are converted to Version 2 scores by adding 1.07897.
Further details are available at http://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/download_
data/pufs/h147/h147doc.pdf.
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Preventive checks (MEPS) For each preventive check (dental, cholesterol,
general, flu shot, prostate check, pap smear, breast examination and mammog-
raphy), we create a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a person did the corre-
sponding check within the preceding two years and zero otherwise.
Medical expenditure (MEPS) We use total medical (health care) expendi-
tures. Expenditures are defined as the sum of direct payments for care pro-
vided during the year, including out-of-pocket payments and payments by pri-
vate insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, and other sources. Payments for over the
counter drugs and for alternative care services are not. Indirect payments not
related to specific medical events, such as Medicaid Disproportionate Share and
Medicare Direct Medical Education subsidies, are not included either. When-
ever medical expenditure is used, we drop observations with unavailable medi-
cal expenditure. Expenditures are deflated by 2005 medical CPI, available at
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?cu.
Insurance (MEPS) We use the insurance coverage variable and distinguish
between “any private insurance”, “any public insurance” and “no insurance”.
Whenever indicated, we create two dummies, public or private, which take the
value of one if the individual holds the corresponding insurance (public and pri-
vate insurance are not mutually exclusive). Otherwise, we create an indicator
variable that equals one if the individual holds any insurance, public or private.
Whenever insurance information is used, observations with unavailable insurance
are dropped.
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics
Table B1—Descriptive Statistics: Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
Mean St. dev. Min Max N.obs.
i. Baseline
Healthy 0.88 0.33 0.0 1.0 150,062
Married 0.66 0.47 0.0 1.0 150,062
Age 41.63 11.82 20.0 64.0 150,062
Female 0.53 0.50 0.0 1.0 150,062
Black 0.12 0.33 0.0 1.0 150,062
College 0.32 0.47 0.0 1.0 150,062
Children 0-3 years 0.16 0.36 0.0 1.0 150,062
Children 4-12 years 0.28 0.45 0.0 1.0 150,062
Children 13-18 years 0.21 0.41 0.0 1.0 150,062
Taxable income (in 1000$) 37.76 50.03 -590.2 5,500.0 150,062
ii. Robustness and further explorations
Married+cohabiting 0.72 0.45 0.0 1.0 150,062
Divorced/separated 0.16 0.36 0.0 1.0 150,062
Widowed 0.02 0.15 0.0 1.0 150,062
Never Married 0.16 0.37 0.0 1.0 150,062
Marriage capital 18.65 11.97 0.0 52.0 114,627
Height (inches) 67.21 3.86 51.0 82.0 111,397
Weight (pounds) 175.11 42.77 75.0 400.0 42,975
Smoke 0.22 0.42 0.0 1.0 61,360
Num. of chronic conditions 0.73 1.09 0.0 10.0 54,466
Chronic conditions:
Stroke 0.02 0.13 0.0 1.0 54,443
Hypertension 0.22 0.41 0.0 1.0 54,430
Diabetes 0.07 0.26 0.0 1.0 54,432
Cancer 0.04 0.20 0.0 1.0 54,430
Lung disease 0.04 0.20 0.0 1.0 54,432
Heart attack 0.02 0.14 0.0 1.0 54,444
Arthritis 0.14 0.35 0.0 1.0 54,435
Asthma 0.10 0.30 0.0 1.0 54,437
Memory loss 0.01 0.11 0.0 1.0 54,433
Learning disord. 0.03 0.16 0.0 1.0 54,433
Note: Means and standard deviations are computed using weights. The sample covers 1984-2013,
annually until 1997, bianually since then. Chronic conditions and smoking data is only available starting
in 1999. Taxable income is deflated by 2005 CPI.
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Table B2—Descriptive Statistics: Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
Mean St. dev. Min Max N.obs.
i. Baseline
Healthy 0.88 0.31 0.0 1.0 235,094
Married 0.58 0.47 0.0 1.0 235,094
Age 40.66 11.70 20.0 64.0 235,094
Female 0.51 0.48 0.0 1.0 235,094
Black 0.12 0.31 0.0 1.0 235,094
College 0.35 0.46 0.0 1.0 235,094
Children 0-3 years 0.15 0.34 0.0 1.0 235,094
Children 4-12 years 0.26 0.42 0.0 1.0 235,094
Children 13-18 years 0.38 0.46 0.0 1.0 235,094
Taxable income (in 1000$) 34.61 30.70 0.0 658.6 235,094
ii. Robustness and further explorations
Objective health index 51.15 9.26 4.6 76.1 160,057
Total health expenditure 3.04 9.47 0.0 1,051.5 235,094
Uninsured 0.16 0.35 0.0 1.0 235,094
Preventive checks:
Dental 0.50 0.48 0.0 1.0 231,873
Cholesterol 0.51 0.48 0.0 1.0 221,942
Complete 0.57 0.47 0.0 1.0 227,623
Flu shot 0.26 0.42 0.0 1.0 229,296
Prostate 0.22 0.38 0.0 1.0 90,412
Pap smear 0.54 0.48 0.0 1.0 140,965
Breast 0.55 0.48 0.0 1.0 136,720
Mammography 0.36 0.46 0.0 1.0 119,403
Note: Means and standard deviations are computed exploiting sampling stratification design. The
sample covers 1996-2009 annually. Taxable income is deflated by 2005 CPI.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 51 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1745
Figure B1. Health and Marital Status, Different Socioeconomic Groups (MEPS)
A. Male vs female B. White vs black C. Without vs with children (0-12)
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D. College vs non-College E. Above vs below median income F. Old vs Young Cohorts
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Note: This figure reproduces the results in Figure 2 using the MEPS sample. Plotted lines represent
the weighted fraction of married and unmarried individuals that report being healthy. Fractions are
reported, as indicated, for male and female, white and black, without and with children aged 0-12 living
in the household, college graduates and non-college, above and below median income, and born after and
before 1970. The horizontal axis indicates age, which is grouped in five-year categories (20-24 through
60-64). Confidence bands of ± two standard errors are computed using sample stratification design.
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Appendix C: Further Description of the GFE Estimator
This description borrows heavily on Bonhomme and Manresa (2015). A more
detailed description and discussion about the estimator’s properties can be found
at the original source. The GFE estimator is defined as the solution of the fol-
lowing minimization problem:
(α̂, β̂, γ̂, ̂) = argmin
α(·),β(·),γ,
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(hit − α(ait, ηgi)− β(ait)mit + x′itγ)2 , (C1)
where the minimum is taken over the functions α and β, the parameter vector γ,
and over all possible groupings  = {g1, ..., gN} of the N individuals into G groups
(i.e., gi ∈ {1, ..., G} for i = 1, ..., N). Thus, for given values of α, β, and γ, the
optimal assignment of an individual i to a group gi is given by:
ĝi(α, β, θ) = argmin
g∈{1,...,G}
T∑
t=1
(hit − α(ait, ηg)− β(ait)mit + x′itγ)2 , (C2)
which allows writing the GFE estimator of α, β, and γ as:
(α̂, β̂, γ̂) = argmin
α(·),β(·),γ
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(
hit − α(ait, ηĝi(α,β,θ))− β(ait)mit + x′itγ
)2
, (C3)
The estimation algorithm proposed by Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) follows
from an iterative implementation of Equations (C2) and (C3). Starting from an
initial guess of (α, β, γ), individuals are assigned to types based on Equation (C2).
Given the assigned types, estimation of Equation C3 follows from standard least
squares. This allows reassigning types using Equation (C2), and iterate again.
Unlike standard finite mixture modeling, this approach does not specify group
probabilities as parametric or semi-parametric functions of observed covariates.
Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) provide the conditions for consistency. Given
the application that we do in this paper, we can additionally assume that the G
population groups (2 in our case) have a large number of observations and are
well separated.30 In this case, identification comes from the comparison of health
levels of married and single individuals in each group and at each age. Once again,
individuals who do not change marital status still contribute to the identification
of the single (or married) health curves.
30 Bonhomme and Manresa (2015) derive the asymptotic distribution for this case.
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Appendix D: Detailed Baseline Results
Table D1—Estimated Coefficients from Baseline Regressions
PSID MEPS
Fixed- Grouped F.E. System-
OLS Effects Type I Type II GMM OLS
Marriage gap β(a):
20-24 0.004 -0.015 -0.001 0.008 -0.025
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
25-29 0.024 -0.010 0.009 0.029 0.014
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
30-34 0.029 -0.004 0.013 0.031 0.030
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
35-39 0.041 -0.008 0.013 0.038 0.039
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005)
40-44 0.054 0.006 0.018 0.053 0.051
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006)
45-49 0.069 0.019 0.022 0.060 0.063
(0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006)
50-54 0.100 0.053 0.050 0.073 0.085
(0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.017) (0.007)
55-59 0.105 0.047 0.043 0.105 0.078
(0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.020) (0.008)
60-64 0.112 0.044 0.040 0.099 0.078
(0.017) (0.014) (0.010) (0.021) (0.009)
Singles health curve α(a):
20-24 0.914 0.948 0.975 0.664 0.747 0.914
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.017) (0.014) (0.004)
25-29 0.883 0.936 0.964 0.624 0.736 0.873
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.014) (0.005)
30-34 0.859 0.918 0.955 0.537 0.727 0.836
(0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.016) (0.014) (0.007)
35-39 0.828 0.904 0.944 0.469 0.711 0.804
(0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.015) (0.008)
40-44 0.785 0.868 0.922 0.368 0.687 0.771
(0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.015) (0.008)
45-49 0.743 0.834 0.900 0.286 0.656 0.729
(0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009)
50-54 0.687 0.779 0.858 0.169 0.617 0.687
(0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.019) (0.010)
55-59 0.656 0.752 0.837 0.106 0.549 0.670
(0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.011)
60-64 0.646 0.736 0.827 0.075 0.531 0.660
(0.019) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.021) (0.013)
Lagged health 0.150
(0.013)
College 0.069 0.002 0.020 0.060 0.055
(0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Female -0.004 -0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Black -0.087 -0.038 -0.020
(0.011) (0.005) (0.003)
Children 0-3 years 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Children 4-12 years -0.004 0.006 0.000 -0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Children 13-18 years -0.000 0.006 -0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Taxable income (in 1000$) -0.012 0.006 -0.003 -0.015 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Birth year dummies: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table presents point estimates and standard errors for the coefficients of the regressions in
Figures 4 through 6. Standard errors are clustered at the household level in the PSID and follow survey
design in the MEPS.
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Appendix E: Assortative Mating: Additional Results
Table E1—Contingency Tables: Assortative Mating from Chronic Conditions
Innate permanent health (ηi)
Observed marital sorting % Random matching %
Wife Wife
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Marginal
H
u
sb
a
n
d
1 8.6 3.6 1.3 3.5 2.4 3.9 4.7 3.7 3.8 3.2 19.3
2 3.6 8.6 3.5 4.4 3.0 4.7 5.7 4.4 4.6 3.8 23.2
3 1.6 4.0 7.4 3.6 3.0 4.0 4.8 3.7 3.9 3.2 19.7
4 3.7 5.2 3.8 4.4 3.6 4.2 5.1 3.9 4.1 3.4 20.7
5 2.6 3.2 3.0 3.9 4.5 3.5 4.2 3.3 3.4 2.8 17.2
Marginal 20.1 24.6 19.0 19.8 16.4 20.1 24.6 19.0 19.8 16.4 100.0
Innate health type (ηg(i))
Observed Random
sorting % matching %
Wife Wife
Husband Low High Low High Marginal
Low 20.0 17.4 17.3 20.1 37.4
High 26.2 36.4 28.9 33.7 62.6
Marginal 46.2 53.8 46.2 53.8 100.0
Note: The table replicates the results in Table 5 using innate health measures obtained from the
regressions for chronic conditions presented in Figure 8B.
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